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Abstract
During the last crisis, developed economies’ sovereign Credit Default Swap (hereafter CDS) 
premia have gained in importance as a tool for approximating credit risk. In this paper, we fit 
a dynamic factor model to decompose the sovereign CDS spreads of ten OECD economies 
into three components: a common factor, a second factor driven by European peripheral 
countries and an idiosyncratic component. We use this decomposition to propose a novel 
methodology based on the real-time estimates of the model to characterize contagion 
among the ten series. Our procedure allows the country that triggers contagion in each 
period, which can be any peripheral economy, to be disentangled. According to our findings, 
since the onset of the sovereign debt crisis, contagion has played a non-negligible role 
in the European peripheral countries, which confirms the existence of signifi cant financial 
linkages between these economies.
Keywords: sovereign Credit Default Swaps, contagion, dynamic factor models, credit risk.
JEL classifi cation: C32, G01, G15.
Resumen
Durante la última crisis, la relevancia de las primas de los Credit Default Swaps (en adelante, 
CDS) de las economías desarrolladas como herramienta para aproximar el riesgo de crédito ha 
ido en aumento. En este artículo se utiliza un modelo factorial dinámico para descomponer las 
primas de los CDS soberanos de diez economías de la OCDE en tres componentes: un factor 
común, un segundo factor ligado a la evolución de los diferenciales de las economías periféricas 
de la zona del euro y un componente idiosincrásico. Una vez modeladas las series, se propone 
una nueva metodología basada en las estimaciones en tiempo real del modelo utilizado para 
caracterizar el contagio entre los diez países. Este procedimiento permite esclarecer en cada 
período cuál es el país donde se origina el contagio, que puede ser cualquier economía 
periférica. Según los resultados obtenidos, desde el inicio de la crisis de deuda soberana 
europea el contagio ha desempeñado un papel indiscutible en los países periféricos, lo que 
confi rma la presencia de importantes vínculos fi nancieros entre estas economías.
Palabras clave: Credit Default Swaps soberanos, contagio, modelos factoriales dinámicos, 
riesgo de crédito.
Códigos JEL: C32, G01, G15.
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1 Introduction
Understanding the dynamics of the recent increase of sovereign credit risk in the euro area is
crucial given its financial stability implications and its major role in determining the financing
costs of the public sector. Thus, higher perceived risk implies higher long-term domestic interest
rates, which in turn increase debt costs and offset the stimulus measures adopted during the
crisis. Besides, higher sovereign risk has adverse effects on bank funding conditions and financial
markets (BIS, 2011).
Since the onset of the financial crisis in 2007, the sovereign credit default swap (hereafter,
sovereign CDS) market in developed economies has become more liquid and trading volumes
have strongly increased.1 A CDS is an OTC (over-the-counter) derivative that functions as an
insurance contract, where a protection buyer pays a fixed amount (the CDS premium) to the
seller until maturity or until the occurrence of the credit event (Duffie 1999, Pan and Singleton,
2008).2 For a sovereign CDS, the credit event is equivalent to the issuer country defaulting on
its payment commitments. If this occurs before the CDS maturity, the protection seller pays
a compensation to the buyer.3 The premium paid by the buyer of a CDS can be decomposed
into two basic components: the default risk and the sovereign risk premium component, which
is the largest part of the spread (Remolona et al., 2007).
In principle, given the theoretical no-arbitrage condition (Duffie, 1999), sovereign risk can be
approximated either through the interest rate spreads on public debt or through the risk premia
from sovereign CDS.4 We chose to analyze sovereign CDS spreads instead of bond spreads for
two reasons. First, bond spread quantification involves choosing a risk-free rate, which means
losing the spread of a relevant country in any empirical analysis.5, 6 Second, in certain periods
of financial stress there can be significant discrepancies between both measures. For example,
1According to the BIS (2010), the outstanding amount of sovereign CDS in the first half of 2010 was around
13% of all CDS, whereas at the beginning of the crisis (second half of 2007) this ratio was 6%.
2One key legal difference between a sovereign CDS and an insurance contract is that, contrary to an insurance
contract, the CDS does not require the insured asset (that is, the sovereign bond) to be held.
3The International Swaps and Derivatives Association (ISDA) defines three possible credit events for a
sovereign CDS, namely: failure to pay coupon or principal, restructuring and repudiation/moratorium.
4An abundant strand of this literature analyzes the deviations from this parity and price discovery between
CDS and bond spreads. See Blanco et al. (2005), who study this link for corporate CDS spreads.
5In any case, recently the pool of government bonds considered as risk-free assets has narrowed so that their
election would not be straightforward (Cooper and Scholtes, 2001).
6To overcome this problem, alternatively other authors use the swap rate as a risk-free rate to compute bond
spreads (Fontana and Scheicher, 2010).
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some bond yields could be driven by other effects, such as the “flight to quality” by investors.
Nevertheless, during periods of turmoil, CDS spreads can also capture components attributable
to counterparty risk (Arce et al., 2013)7 or liquidity risk (see Das and Hanouna (2009) for
corporate CDS).8
Despite the increasing relevance of sovereign CDS spreads, there are still few studies on
their dynamics. Until the onset of the financial crisis, most research was focused on emerging
markets, where these derivatives were already liquid from the beginning of the 2000s (see,
among others, Pan and Singleton, 2008; Longstaff et al. 2011; Remolona et al., 2007).9 By
contrast, the literature on sovereign CDS for developed countries is still at an early stage amid
strong doubts among market participants about its functioning.10 However, as these time series
become longer and this market deepens, these spreads are turning into an alternative measure
of credit risk to government bonds in empirical applications. As a result, the recent literature
that explicitly deals with sovereign CDS spreads in the euro area is increasing. Among other
topics, these empirical works analyze CDS spread determinants or their link with bond spreads
(price discovery).11
There are two empirical regularities in the literature on sovereign CDS spreads of relevance
for our analysis. First, sovereign premia exhibit a strong commonality, meaning they are highly
related to a common factor. For instance, Longstaff et al. (2011) analyze 26 sovereign CDS
spreads (mostly from emerging countries) and conclude that the first principal component rep-
resents 64% of their total variation (see also Remolona et al., 2007). Second, sovereign credit
risk seems to be mostly driven by global market factors rather than by country-specific funda-
mentals, as the changes in the common component of sovereign CDS premia are closely related
to developments in aggregate worldwide risk aversion. Hence, Longstaff et al. (2011), in keeping
with Pan and Singleton (2008), interpret that the main source of variation across credit spreads
is linked to US stock market returns and volatility (as proxied by the VIX index).
7According to Arce et al. (2013), the presence of counterparty risk during global episodes of distress makes
the use of bond spreads preferable.
8The lack of consensus among authors regarding the advisability of using CDS spreads or bond spreads to
analyze crisis periods leads to some authors using both measures as a robustness check (Caporin et al., 2013).
9To date, the more developed strand of the literature on CDS is that on corporate CDS rather than sovereign
CDS spreads. See Blanco et al. (2005), Longstaff et al. (2005), or Ericsson et al. (2009), among others.
10For instance, Duffie (2010) analyzes whether speculation drives up European sovereign CDS spreads.
11See Fontana and Scheicher, 2010; Arce et al., 2013; Carboni, 2011 or Palladini and Portes, 2011, for some
recent papers on price discovery between sovereign CDS premia and bond yields. Alberola et al. (2012) analyze
a broad sample of emerging and developed countries with a panel data model.
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Given these regularities it seems sensible to use a dynamic factor model to analyze sovereign
CDS spread dynamics. However, one of the peculiarities of the European sovereign debt crisis
regarding multivariate credit risk modeling is that the classical factor decomposition into two
factors—namely, common and idiosyncratic—has become obsolete given the emergence of a
third element rooted in contagion from third countries. This new framework calls for rethinking
as to how to model accurately the influence of individual countries, which will not be captured in
the common component, taking into account that the country that drives contagion can change
over time. For instance, Greece formally asked for a financial assistance programme in April
2010, which coincided with an increase of the CDS spreads of the remaining developed countries,
especially the European peripheral economies. However, in an accurate time series exercise it
would not be correct to consider Greece as the sole source of contagion in the subsequent time
span. For instance, Ireland and Portugal could have also exerted an influence in the remaining
countries when they asked for their assistance programmes in November 2010 and April 2011,
respectively. Given the importance of financial contagion in the context of the sovereign debt
crisis, this literature is growing rapidly, both for sovereign CDS and bond spreads (see, for
instance, Amisano and Tristani, 2011; Fornari, 2012 or Caporin et al. 2013).12
The main objective of this paper is to analyze with a dynamic factor model the sovereign
CDS spreads of ten OECD countries, namely, eight euro area countries, the United States and
the United Kingdom.13 Apart from the common and idiosyncratic component, we also fit a
third component that is related to the impact of peripheral countries. As a novel contribution
of the paper, once we decompose the ten series, we identify contagion using the estimates of
the model in real-time by focusing on the dynamics of the elements of the Kalman filter. In a
sense, our model approach is in line with that of Dungey and Martin (2007), as we also fit a
dynamic factor model but, contrary to them, our contagion identification is not model-based
but is disentangled through the real-time estimates of the model once it is identified. The main
advantage of our procedure compared to previous models is that we do not impose the country
source of contagion, which can vary across periods. That is to say, as our identification method
is dynamic our approach is more flexible and realistic than those of prior empirical exercises.
12For further empirical works on financial contagion during the European sovereign debt crisis following diverse
methodologies see, for instance, Andermatten and Brill, 2011; Zhang et al., 2011; Kalbaska and Gatkowski, 2012;
Gu¨ndu¨z and Kaya, 2013 or Manasse and Zavalloni, 2013.
13As far as we know, to date Kocsis (2012) and Manasse and Zavalloni (2013) are the only papers that use a
multivariate model to analyze sovereign credit risk in the euro area.
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The remainder of this paper is organized as follows. After the introduction, Section 2 briefly
reviews the literature on financial contagion and presents the specific definition of contagion
that we use in this paper. In Section 3 we describe the data set and provide some intuition
about how to aggregate CDS spreads data in a multivariate framework, which will be useful to
enhance our dynamic factor model specification to decompose CDS spreads as stated in Section
4. In Section 5 we introduce our proposal to disentangle contagion based on the real-time
estimates of the model and present the main empirical results for our sample. Finally, Section
6 concludes.
2 What is contagion? A literature overview
Currently, there is still no consensus on the definition of contagion, which has led to a broad
empirical literature.14 In this paper, we define contagion as a significant variation in the cross-
country co-movement of CDS spreads, compared with that of non-crisis periods, triggered by
a specific country or group of countries. Thus, according to our characterization of contagion,
country-specific shocks become ‘common’. Note that the transmission of the idiosyncratic shocks
goes beyond what could be expected from the usual linkages between these CDS spreads in
periods of calm (Constaˆncio, 2012), whereby the underlying interdependence between countries
before the crisis is not contagion.15
Obviously, the quantification of contagion is highly dependent on its specific definition, so
that there are practically as many modeling strategies as definitions. For the sake of simplicity,
these methodologies can be classified in three broad categories. First, those authors that inter-
pret contagion as an structural break in the transmission of shocks, such as Forbes and Rigobon
(2002), Favero and Giavazzi (2002), Bae et al. (2003) or Corsetti et al. (2005), who identify
contagion through increased bivariate correlations during stress periods. They correct these cor-
relations for the hereroscedasticy bias of market returns during crises before testing.16 Along
these lines, other papers have introduced the non-linearities inherent to financial data using the
increased correlations of extreme negative events through extreme value analysis (Longin and
Solnik, 2001; Hartmann et al., 2004).
14See Claessens and Forbes (2001), Pericoli and Sbracia (2003) or Dungey et al. (2005) for a survey on financial
contagion definitions and identification methodologies.
15Interdependence can be defined as a change in correlation that is consistent with the data generating process
(Forbes and Rigobon, 2002).
16Corsetti et al. (2005) propose a single factor model with common and idiosyncratic components.
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Second, other authors focus on the shock transmission beyond common fundamentals with
respect to non-crisis periods. Those fundamentals could be interpreted as economic, which has
led to empirical papers using VAR specifications (Bekaert et al. 1995), or could be related to
pre-existing common factors. In this second case, these commonalities are analyzed by means
of dynamic factor models that allow the study of the linkages between different asset classes
and countries (Dungey and Martin, 2007).17 In this line, some early papers study variations in
the cointegration relations after one shock, as contagion was interpreted as changes in the long
run links between markets (Longin and Solnik, 2001).
Finally, a third group of papers do not strictly study contagion but spillovers. An spillover
is the lagged transmission of a shock, whereas contagion is simultaneous in nature. To this
category belong those papers that study volatility spillovers by means of GARCH type models
(Edwards, 1998) or those that identify contagion as a significant increase in the conditional
probability of a crisis given a previous crisis in another country or market through probit or
logit models (Eichengreen et al., 1996).
All in all, how does our definition and methodology fit into this vast literature? We strictly
analyze contagion and not spillovers, as the real-time analysis allows to disentangle simultaneous
effects in each iteration. Besides, as already mentioned, we analyze simultaneously 10 OECD
countries, so that our interest is not in pairwise tests based on bivariate correlations as in Forbes
and Rigobon (2002) or Corsetti et al. (2005) kind of tests. Thus, given our contagion definition,
our methodology could be classified in the second group of empirical papers, as we condition
contagion to the existence of common factors before the onset of the European debt crisis and
the appearance of new dynamic factors in the post-crisis period. However, it is not directly
comparable with previous papers of this category, as we use real-time estimates of the model to
disentangle contagion for the first time in this field. In the next sections we describe in detail
the dataset an the methodology.
3 The dataset
3.1 Data and descriptive statistics
We analyze the dynamics of the sovereign ten-year CDS premia of Belgium, France, Germany,
Greece, Ireland, Italy, Portugal, Spain, United Kingdom and United States. We chose this
17See Cerra and Saxena (2002), Favero and Giavazzi (2002) or Dungey and Martin (2004) for a partial list of
other approaches that also analyze empirically cross border transmissions from a single asset class.
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sample of OECD economies to encompass eight countries of the euro area, both core and
peripheral, and a control group of two additional developed economies, US and UK, that serve as
further examples of “safe” countries—in opposition to the six European peripheral countries—
. Although we could have included further developed economies in the sample, as the main
contribution of the paper is methodological, an exhaustive country sample would not lead to
significant additional information.18 The maturity of the CDS premia was selected given that,
contrary to corporate CDS, whose trading is more concentrated in 5-year contracts, sovereign
CDS at maturities between 1 and 10 year are actively traded (Pan and Singleton, 2008). Besides,
the ten year maturity is preferable for comparability reasons with the ten-year sovereign debt
spreads. We use weekly data from 1/1/2007 to 12/3/2012, that is, T = 272.19 Before 2007
market liquidity was still scarce, so that our analysis starts from that date. The end of the
sample period has been chosen to coincide with the activation of the Greek CDS by the ISDA
(International Swaps and Derivatives Association) once the Greek default was confirmed. All
CDS premia are expressed in basis points (bp henceforth) and denominated in US dollars. Our
data were obtained through Datastream.20
Figure 1 shows the evolution of the ten sovereign CDS spreads. Clearly, the highest increases
correspond to the CDS premia of Greece, followed by those of Portugal and Ireland, which
also received financial assistance by the IMF. The CDS spreads of other European peripheral
countries, like Spain or Italy, whose credit ratings were also downgraded on different occasions,
overcame 500 bp, whereas that of Belgium exceeded 300 bp at the end of the sample. The
spreads of United States, France and Germany moved in a narrower range, although the French
premium picked up in the last part of the sample.
Table 1 reports summary statistics of the CDS spreads for the whole sample period, as
well as for the subsamples previous and posterior to the outbreak of the sovereign crisis in
the euro area. We date this breakpoint in 12th October 2009 for two reasons. First, this is
the moment when the Greek CDS spread overcame the other nine CDS and never came back.
Besides, that week coincided with the starting rumors regarding solvency in Greece. Table 1
illustrates that the CDS spreads increased throughout the sample period and, as also shown
18For instance, Australia, Denmark, Japan, Norway, Sweden, Switzerland, and, in the euro area, Austria,
Finland and the Netherlands also have a relatively liquid market of sovereign CDS.
19We use weekly data instead of daily data to avoid the need of a more complex model to capture the second
order moments’ dynamics of these series.
20Before 4/10/2010 the data source for the CDS spreads was CMA, whereas after that date the source is
Thomson Reuters.
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in Figure 1, those countries that were more affected by the European sovereign crisis—namely,
Greece, Ireland, Portugal, Spain, Italy and even Belgium—, also exhibited the higher mean and
standard deviation in the second subperiod, when all the CDS spread maxima are concentrated
as well. However, as it can be inferred from Figure 1 and Table 1, these clear differences between
peripheral and non-peripheral sovereigns did not occur prior to the European sovereign debt
crisis. In the next subsection we exploit more formally this feature.
3.2 Aggregating the information of CDS spreads
Next, we provide some evidence about how do we aggregate the information of sovereign CDS
spreads, which will be useful for the proposal of our dynamic factor model specification in
the following section. Most of the previous literature that analyzes sovereign credit risk with
CDS spreads use standard multivariate procedures to reduce the dimensionality problem—for
instance, Pan and Singleton (1998) or Ang and Longstaff (2011) use principal components—.
Along these lines, we also consider the CDS spreads decomposition based on principal compo-
nents to make a preliminary characterization of the main properties of the series. The purpose
of this subsection is to provide some evidence about the assumptions to be applied to identify
the factors in our dynamic model.
In our sample all spreads are I(1).21 As a first step, we should identify the number of
cointegration relations in the dataset. Thus, when all variables are I(1), as in our case, Stock
and Watson (1988) demonstrate that N variables with r linearly independent cointegration
relations imply N − r common factors. In Table 2 we report the cointegration tests, which are
needed to identify r. The tests for the complete sample indicate that the ten spreads entail
eight cointegration equations that imply the existence of two common factors, which we denote
as f1 and f2.22
However, the identification of the number of common factors varies throughout the sample
period. Preciselly, one of the main characteristics of the dynamics of our CDS spreads is
that they entail significantly different dynamics during the first subsample, that is, prior to
the sovereign debt crisis. Table 2 also reports the cointegration tests for this subsample and
confirms that there are clearly nine cointegration relations, so that only one factor is needed.
Indeed, before the sovereign crisis the spreads exhibit a high degree of co-movement, as also
21Standard Dickey-Fuller tests for the null hypothesis of unit root are available upon request.
22The p-value of seven versus eight is 0.08 (significant at 10% level), so that we consider eight cointegration
relations.
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shown by the first principal component, which explains more than 96% of their total variation,
in line with the empirical applications in Pan and Singleton (1998) or Ang and Longstaff (2011).
As already mentioned, our final purpose is to estimate a dynamic factor model for the CDS
spreads that includes the two factors required by the long term relations of these variables.
However, as it is well known, it is necessary to impose certain assumptions to identify a dynamic
model with two distinct factors. Up to now, the unique available information about the second
factor is that it only appears in the second subsample, although the main drivers of this second
factor are still unknown. As a first approach, we calculate two common factors using principal
components for the complete sample period. We call the estimated first and second factors
PC1 and PC2, respectively. The weights of each series in the two principal components for
the full sample estimation are shown in Table 3. They indicate that PC1 is basically driven by
an equally weighted average of each series, whereas PC2 is fundamentally driven by a subset
of the spreads related to the peripheral countries of the EMU. As shown in the cointegration
analysis, PC2 explains, not only an important proportion of the variance, but also the long term
movements of the series. The results are obviously different when estimating the two factors for
the first subsample, as also reported in Table 3. In this period, the PC1 explains a significant
proportion of the variance of the series. However, PC2 explains only 1% of the variance and its
weights do not have any economic interpretation, implying, as already shown, that one factor
would be enough to explain the comovements across all the economies in the first subsample.
It is also important to analyze the stability of the two principal components, PC1 and PC2,
regardless the sample period. Figure 2 shows the evolution of PC1 and PC2 using, on the one
hand, the whole sample and, on the other hand, the first subsample. Whereas the correlation
between both PC1, the one calculated for the first subsample and for the complete sample, is
0.99, the correlation between both PC2 is only 0.17. That is, PC2 changes dramatically with
the change in the sample. This evidence indicates that there is definitely something going on in
the second subsample that alters dramatically the dynamics of the time series, which even has
an effect on the long term properties of the spreads. Given the weights of PC2 for the entire
sample, it is related to the behavior of the peripheral countries in the Euro zone.23
23An alternative method that could be more suited to estimate the long term factors that drive the long run
behavior of our 10 series could be that of Gonzalo and Granger (1995). The main advantage of this latter
approach is that the two estimated factors contain only long run dynamics. That is, they are not contaminated
by short term movements. However, the estimated coefficients do not have any economic interpretation. Despite
this drawback, we have also estimated the two factors using this second procedure. We find that the first and
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Finally, as further evidence on the different dynamics of the ten series before and after the
European debt crisis, Table 4 reports the correlation matrix with the subsample until October
2009. As expected, before the sovereign debt crisis there was a high degree of correlation
between sovereigns. Indeed, the lower correlations between spreads during this period amounted
to around 90%. However, this correlation dropped later, as confirmed by Table 5 that shows the
difference of the correlation matrix of the second subsample, minus that of the first subsample.
Almost all these differences are negative (they are zero for three pairs), which signals the
differential dynamics of spreads in the aftermath of the crisis.
All in all, this evidence suggests the need of including the two common factors in a unique
model specification, as shown in the next section. Besides, and more importantly, this analysis
indicates an structural break in the series, as before the crisis only one common factor was
identified, whereas after the outbreak of the crisis two factors were necessary. This fact will be
crucial for our proposal for contagion identification.
4 Modeling strategy: A dynamic factor model
I(1) variables such as our CDS spreads can be fitted by means of a dynamic factor model
using the Kalman filter.24 Pen˜a and Poncela (2006) demonstrate that I(1) variables do not
prevent the use of multivariate models for dimension reduction, such as principal components
or dynamic factor models, as non-stationary factors can be identified and their estimation can
be carried out in state space form.
Therefore, let yt = (y1t, ..., y10t)′ be a (10× 1) vector of sovereign CDS spreads where
yit = Aif1t + Bif2t + uit ∀i = 1, ..., 10 (1)
and
f1t = f1t−1 + ε
f1
t , ε
f1
t ∼ N(0, 1) (2)
f2t = f2t−1 + ε
f2
t , ε
f2
t ∼ N(0, 1) (3)
uit = φiuit−1 + νit, νit ∼ N(0, σ2νi) (4)
the second factor are highly correlated with those obtained by principal components. These results are available
upon request.
24Although I(1) variables do not prevent the use of multivariate models for dimension reduction, such as
principal components, Gonzalo and Granger (1995) do provide the necessary algebra to calculate the I(1) common
factors and decompose the series in permanent and transitory components. However, as previously mentioned,
given the lack of economic interpretation of the resulting decomposition we disregard this alternative approach.
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and E(uit, ujt) = 0 ∀i = j; E(uit, f1t) = 0 and E(uit, f2t) = 0 ∀i, so that these components
are mutually independent.
The first component, f1t, is the factor that is related to the dynamics driven by shocks
that are common to the ten countries, whereas the second component, f2t, only reflects the
contribution of the CDS spreads of the six countries that we consider as peripheral—namely,
Greece, Ireland, Portugal, Spain, Italy and Belgium—in line with the outcomes of previous
section. To enhance the model identification in the estimation process, we assume f2t to be
driven by this subsample of six economies, instead of using the ten spreads. If we had not
constrained the second factor, we would have obtained similar estimates of f2t.25 Finally, uit
stands for the idiosyncratic component of each CDS spread, which is assumed to be stationary
for simplicity. The disturbances of the common factors, εf1t and ε
f2
t , are Gaussian with unit
variance.
Once we express the model from (1) to (4) in a convenient state space representation, the
Kalman filter can be applied to compute the likelihood function to be maximized and obtain the
estimates of the model. Specifically, the measurement equation follows this compact expression,
yt = H ht + wt, (5)
where wt ∼ N(0, R), yt denotes the (10×1) vector of CDS spreads and the (12×1) state vector,
ht, is given by
ht = (f1t f2t u1t, . . . , u10t)′ (6)
The transition equation follows this expression,
ht = F ht−1 + ξt, (7)
where ξt ∼ N(0, Q). See Appendix A for a detailed description of all the elements of the
measurement and transition equations in (5) and (7).
The estimates of the loading matrices for the whole sample are shown in Table 6. For the
factor f1t the loadings are similar for all countries while f2t is linked to the peripheral countries.
Figure 3 shows the evolution of the two factors for the sample period. The factor f1t is linked
to the comovements of the common drivers of CDS spreads, and captures aggregate risk, with
a spike coinciding with Lehman Brothers’ collapse, and a steady growth in the last part of the
sample. On the contrary, f2t only increases in the second part of the sample, and presents sharp
movements associated to specific news in the sovereign CDS market.
25The estimates of f2t computed for the full sample of ten countries are available upon request.
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The factor model allows to decompose the CDS spreads as a function of the two common
components, that for country i would be Aif1t +Bif2t, and an idiosyncratic shock,(uit). Figure
4 shows the decomposition of the Spanish CDS spread according to our factor model. One
possible interpretation of the figure—based on an standard factor analysis—is that the Spanish
spread has been influenced by the evolution of the risk that is common to the ten countries
(f1t) and by the peripheral countries’ risk (f2t). Besides, it seems that Spain has tried to fight
against this increase by means of an idiosyncratic behavior that is particularly negative when
the CDS spread is higher.
However, this standard factor analysis does not allow to disentangle which is the contribution
of the Spanish CDS spread to the factors as, if we use the standard weights decomposition, these
weights only measure the relative importance of each variable in the factors for the average of
the sample. However, as already shown, these weights change over time, and perhaps, they
specially vary when an idiosyncratic shock is transmitted to the rest of the variables, and then,
captured by the factor. These changing weights and their relation with the idiosyncratic shocks
are precisely what we quantify in the next section by means of the real-time evolution of the
common dynamics of these series.
Finally, from a methodological point of view, Figure 4 also suggests that fitting the second
factor, f2t, in (1) becomes necessary in the second subsample (that is, after the onset of the
European debt crisis). Thus, if the sample period ended in September 2009, only one factor
would be needed, in line with the evidence in Section 3. This example illustrates that in our
approach f2t will be a key element to identify contagion. In the next section, we analyze more
formally the importance of f2t to disentangle contagion by means a real-time analysis of these
estimates.
5 Disentangling contagion: Real-time analysis
Our proposal is not the first contribution in the literature on contagion that is based on dynamic
factor models. For instance, Dungey et al. (2000) use this approach to analyze yield spreads,
whereas Dungey and Martin (2007) study contagion for currency and equity markets. However,
and contrary to previous contributions, we do not identify contagion directly from the estimates
of the model after imposing the effect of a single country that apparently triggers contagion in
the measurement equation. Instead, we infer contagion using estimations in real-time, leaving
the data speak with respect to which countries affect the others and when this contagion takes
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place. In this section, we first present our methodological proposal to disentangle contagion and
then we present the main empirical results for our CDS spreads dataset.
5.1 Empirical methodology
According to our definition of contagion, which is an abnormal increase in the CDS spreads
co-movement, compared with that of tranquil periods, triggered by a specific country or a
group of countries, the evolution of the common factors, f1t and f2t, will play a crucial role.
That is, if we follow this characterization, contagion could be identified precisely through the
dynamics of f1t and f2t by means of real-time estimates throughout the sample period. We
denote the breakpoint that divides the calm and turmoil subperiods as t∗. Thus, real-time
estimates consist in the computation of the Kalman filter adding one observation to the sample
on each iteration j after t∗ which represents the first period for the out-of-sample analysis, so
that the iterations run from 1 to (T − t∗). In our particular exercise t∗ is the week of 12th
October 2009. Therefore, we start our real-time analysis just before the sovereign debt turmoil,
so that the first observation that we analyze corresponds to the week ending on October 5th
2009. As in the previous sections, the last data corresponds to the week of March 12th 2012,
when ISDA declared Greece to be in default on its debt, which implied the occurrence of a
credit event and the activation of the Greek CDS payments.
As already seen in the previous section, when the sample period also includes the subsample
from October 2009 it also requires a new integrated process to capture the long term dynamics
of the CDS spreads series. This new integrated process, f2t, is simply, as all the unobserved
components obtained under a Kalman filter framework, no more than a weighted average of
current and past data,26 but this process precisely represents these abnormal comovements
in the CDS market, never seen before, so that it entails crucial information to characterize
contagion. What is more, this abnormal CDS premia comovement contains a unit root, which
implies that this comovement is not only abnormal but also persistent throughout the sample
period and determines the long term behavior of the series.
As a preliminary evidence of the outcomes that can be obtained with the real-time estimates,
Figure 5 represents the common factors, f1t and f2t, of the model from (1) to (4) for the first
26We are considering only one-side-filters, because our purpose in the real-time exercise is to analyze the way
in which surprises in one country trigger abnormal comovements in the rest of the series. Those surprises, which
are linked to the prediction errors of the Kalman filter, imply forecast computation and forecasts do not need
smoothing.
BANCO DE ESPAÑA 19 DOCUMENTO DE TRABAJO N.º 1314
iteration, j = 1, and for iteration (T − t∗). Whereas the real-time estimates of the first common
factor, f1t, for j = 1 and for j = T − t∗ nearly co-move, those of f2t exhibit quite different
dynamics. Thus, this distinct evolution of f2t across iterations might entail the influence of
idiosyncratic country shocks, as demonstrated by the own analytic specification of the Kalman
filter throughout the estimation process in real-time. Therefore, we can exploit this feature to
identify contagion through estimations in real-time by using certain elements of the Kalman
filter. This methodology allows to disentangle which idiosyncratic shocks contribute to f2t.
But, which elements of the Kalman filter are needed to analyze the shocks that contribute
to f2t? Once we have confirmed the importance of f2t to identify contagion, we need to carefully
analyze the meaning of “triggered by a specific country or a group of countries”, as stated in the
definition of contagion. The idea is the following. Suppose that we are in (t∗ − 2)—September
29th 2009 to analyze the shocks in October 5th 2009, the last “tranquil” period—. As we
know from previous section, at that moment there was no need to fit the second factor f2t.
Actually, at that time the second factor hardly explains any proportion of the variance of the
data. However, we estimate a factor model with this additional factor, as we know in advance
that it is the best model fit for the whole sample period, and we forecast the next observation
for each of the ten countries in period t∗ − 1.
As the realization in period (t∗ − 1) exactly coincides with the forecast estimated with the
information until period (t∗− 2), obviously the factor f2t does not change its evolution and still
behaves according to the dynamics calculated with the information until (t∗− 2). However this
is true for just (t∗ − 1) but it is false for all the following real-time iterations as the second
factor, f2t, starts being significant and, furthermore, it ends up being not only significant but
also a key driver of the long term dynamics of the series because of its integrated behavior.
Then, from t∗ onwards there is a discrepancy between the forecasted CDS spread values and
their realization in every time period. Therefore, it is clear that the forecasting errors feed the
change in the dynamics of f2t as they are the only source of discrepancy between the expected
and the actual behavior of the series.
At this point and before following on with our analysis to identify contagion in real-time,
we need to formulate the Kalman filter equations (see Appendix 1 for the particular details of
our specification). Namely, let ht|τ be the estimate of ht based on the information up to period
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τ and Pt−1|τ its covariance matrix, we can denote the prediction equations as
ht|t−1 = F ht−1|t−1 (8)
Pt|t−1 = F Pt−1|t−1F ′ + Q (9)
whereas the prediction errors, ηt|t−1, and their corresponding covariance matrix, ζt|t−1, are,
ηt|t−1 = Yt −Hht|t−1 (10)
ζt|t−1 = H P ′t|t−1H + R (11)
Finally, the updating equations for ht|t and Pt|t follow this expression,
ht|t = ht|t−1 + Ktηt|t−1 (12)
Pt|t = Pt|t−1 −KtHPt|t−1, (13)
where Kt, which denotes the Kalman gain, is defined as Kt = Pt|t−1H(ζt|t−1)−1.
Specifically, to identify contagion we use the real-time estimates of Ktηt|t−1 throughout the
(T − t∗) iterations. This expression is the Kalman gain, Kt, multiplied by the forecasting error,
ηt|t−1, that, according to (12), can be interpreted as the updating element of the filter in each
period of the new information available in period t. We do not need to analyze the complete
column vector Ktηt|t−1 of dimension (10 × 1), as we specifically focus on its second element,
which is obtained by the partial product K2tηt|t−1, which is an scalar, where K2t is the second
row of Kt. In this manner, we only use those innovations that influence on f2t and not those
that update f1t. The reason for this is twofold. First, we are worried about contagion among
countries, which it is basically described only through f2t, and second, the real-time estimates
of the first component do not vary significatively after t∗. We use this notation,
K2tηt|t−1 =
10∑
i=1
Kitηit|t−1 =
10∑
i=1
Mit, (14)
where Mit represents the amount in which each CDS spread contributes to the updating of f2t
on each iteration from j = 1 to j = (T − t∗) or, what is the same, from t = t∗ to t = T .27
27There is a technical issue that deserves some further comments. In this kind of models it is impossible to
identify the values of the loading factors and the variance of the factors. Thus, we need to impose an identifying
assumption (tipically variances of factors equal 1). Therefore, if we estimate the model in t and we make forecast
for the variables in t+1 and the realizations are much volatile than the forecasts, we cannot include this increase
in volatility in the variance of the factor which is identify to one in each iteration. To avoid this effect, we
normalize in an slightly different way: we impose the factor to have the same variance than during the subsample
previous to t∗.
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5.2 Empirical results
Next, we represent graphically the elements of the Kalman filter that are relevant to understand
contagion among sovereigns by means of the CDS spreads, namely the forecasting errors, ηit|t−1,
and the contributions to the updating equation of f2t, denoted as Mit. First, given the noisy
dynamics of the ten series, in Figure 6 (upper plot) we represent an eight weeks (two months)
moving average of the series of the forecasting errors, ηit|t−1. As shown in the plot, Greece
presents the highest forecasting errors, but for some periods, Portugal is also a relevant source
of shocks to the dynamics of f2t, as well as Ireland, which is also is a big player, specially around
September 2010.28 On the other hand, countries such as Italy, Spain or Belgium have relatively
low forecasting errors. Figure 6 (lower plot) represents the accumulated forecasting errors, from
the first out-of-sample period to the last one. As shown the figure, Greece seems to have the
highest size of forecasting errors followed by Portugal and Ireland.
However, the size of the errors, ηit|t−1, and the effect that they have over the contagion on
other countries, Mit, are not the same concepts. Estimations of Mit are presented in Figure
7 in the form of the 8 weeks moving average (upper plot) and the accumulated sum from the
beginning of the sample (lower plot). Remarkably, there are serious discrepancies between
Figure 7, where we plot the shocks (that is, the forecasting errors ηit|t−1) times their weights
in every period, and Figure 6, where we represent these shocks, although unweighted. Figure
7 indicates that, even though Portugal had smaller shocks than Greece—see Figure 6—, it had
the highest influence on contagion among countries. This result leads to relevant results for
the study of contagion in the sovereign debt crisis as, comparatively, shocks in Greece had
significantly less influence on contagion to the remaining countries than those shocks of the
same size in Portugal. In other words, a big shock generated by an individual country is not
necessarily related to its capacity to trigger contagion to third countries. Other economy whose
evolution of Mit could call the attention of the reader is that of Spain. Contrary to Greece,
even though, as already shown, their shocks ηit|t−1 are very small, these minor forecasting errors
for Spain are amplified once we multiply them by the Kalman gain to obtain the contributions
to the updating equation of f2t. Thus, it can be interpreted that Spain and Portugal have
been in the eye of the hurricane during the sovereign debt crisis—and, therefore, they have
28By September 2010 the Irish government started negotiations with the ECB and the IMF given the problems
of banks to raise finance that led to higher Irish sovereign bond yields.
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these economies have actually suffered.29
All in all, this procedure to identify contagion based on real-time estimates of Mit offers at
least three advantages compared to previous contributions. First, it is based on a parsimonious
model. Second, the model does not impose the triggering country of contagion, which can be any
economy of the sample (op. Dungey and Martin, 2007). Besides, our contagion identification
is dynamic, in that the contribution of each country to contagion may vary across iterations.
From our point of view, this approach is more realistic than previous methodologies based on
assigning a sole country as contagion source in a fixed amount throughout time. Finally, and
also in contrast to the literature on sovereign contagion during the sovereign debt crisis, what
we are identifying is contagion, in the sense that we are analyzing contemporaneous effects from
the idiosyncratic shocks to the common factors, and not spillovers, which would be related to
lagged effects of these innovations.
However, our method is not free from limitations. The main one is that its use is confined
to those series where an additional common factor is identified after the breakpoint t∗. The
sovereign CDS spreads of developed countries are a good example of these dynamics, but this
method cannot be directly applied to all types of financial series. In this regard, a preliminary
analysis of the emergence of new common factors during the sample period is required to
implement our procedure.
6 Conclusions
Since the onset of the last crisis CDS spreads have become an alternative data source for the
study of sovereign credit risk in developed countries given their increasing liquidity. In this paper
we decompose the sovereign CDS premia of ten OECD countries, eight from the euro area plus
the US and the UK, into three components by means of a rather parsimonious dynamic factor
model: a factor common to all countries, a factor linked to the European peripheral countries and
an idiosyncratic component that captures national factors affecting the market price of premia.
Our study indicates that, although strictly national factors—approximated by the idiosyncratic
component— have played a significant role in the behavior of sovereign spreads, phenomena
such as contagion, which are more attributable to conditions in third countries, also seem to
have operated, masking the effect of the policies of the authorities on the idiosyncratic factor.
29Note that, even though the core countries do not directly affect the evolution of f2t, they contribute indirectly
to it through the dynamics of f1t. This result is a direct implication of the Kalman filter design.
generated contagion—in a way that is more than proportional to the size of the shocks that
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That is to say, although the CDS premia contain very relevant information about sovereign
credit risk, they should be previously corrected by the portion of the premium related to overall
risk aversion and qualified by the contagion effects that may be present in the premia.
The main contribution of the paper is the proposal of a new procedure to characterize
contagion based on the real-time estimates of the dynamic factor model. Our approach has
the advantage of not imposing a sole country as the source of contagion. Indeed, the method
does not need any a-priori regarding the contagion-driving country, which can be any of the
ten economies. Moreover, this method allows the contribution of each country to the overall
contagion to vary over time. This is relevant to reflect the fact that the country that transmits
higher sovereign credit risk to third countries might vary throughout the sample period.
Regarding the interpretation of the empirical results, our analysis confirms that, in the
context of the European sovereign debt crisis, the country source of contagion cannot be assigned
to a sole economy, as it is sequential and varies over time. In other words, during the European
sovereign debt crisis contagion has evolved as a “relay race”: in the first stages of the crisis it
was mostly triggered by Greece, but later it was also transmitted through other countries such
as Portugal, Spain, Ireland or Italy. Further, our real-time analysis provides for the conclusion
that the major shocks of the Greek CDS spreads are not necessarily related to the capacity of
Greece to trigger contagion to third countries. On the contrary, we find that Portugal and, to
a lesser extent, Spain have been more prone to generate contagion. Thus, these countries have
affected other economies in a way that is more than proportional to the size of the shocks that
these economies have actually undergone. We consider that this methodology based on real-
time estimates involves a more realistic approach to the developments during the European debt
crisis than most of the previous empirical contributions based on alternative analytical methods
to identify contagion. Nevertheless, the mere existence of contagion might also indicate the
presence of potential vulnerabilities at a national level which would have to be remedied in
advance to reduce the sovereign risk premium.
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Appendix A: State space representation of the model
In our model, assuming that the six peripheral countries run from country 1 to 6, the measure-
ment equation yt = H ht + wt, with wt ∼ N(0, R) entails,
yt = (y1t, . . . , y10t)′ (15)
wt = 010,1 (16)
R = 010,10 (17)
ht = (f1t f2t u1t, . . . , u10t)′ (18)
where 0i,j denotes a matrix of (i× j) zeroes and the matrix H follows this expression,
H =
(
c d I10
)
(19)
where
c =
(
A1 A2 A3 A4 A5 A6 A7 A8 A9 A10
)′
(20)
d =
(
B1 B2 B3 B4 B5 B6 0 0 0 0
)′
(21)
and I10 is the identity matrix of order 10. The transition equation is ht = F ht−1 + ξt, with
ξt ∼ N(0, Q), where the matrix F is,
F =
⎛
⎝ I2 02,10
010,2 E
⎞
⎠ (22)
where I2 is the identity matrix of order 2 and E is a (10× 10) diagonal matrix with vector e in
the main diagonal, where
e = (φ1, . . . , φ10)′ (23)
Finally, Q is a diagonal matrix where the elements of the main diagonal follow this vector,
q = (σ2ν1 , . . . , σ
2
ν10)
′ (24)
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Figure 1: 10-year CDS spreads: Belgium (BE), France (FR), Germany (GE), United Kingdom
(UK) and United States (US), (left), and Greece (GR), Ireland (IR), Italy (IT) and Portugal
(PT) and Spain (SP) (right).
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Figure 2: First and second principal components (denoted as PC1 and PC2, respectively) before
the onset of the sovereign debt crisis and for the complete sample. Sovereign CDS spreads of
ten OECD countries.
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Figure 3: Estimates of f1t and f2t obtained with the dynamic factor model.
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Figure 4: Decomposition of the Spanish 10-year CDS spread into a common factor (f1), a factor
related to European peripheral countries (f2) and an idiosyncratic factor.
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Figure 5: Real-time estimates of the first and the second common factor, KF1 and KF2—upper
and lower plot, respectively—, of the dynamic factor model.
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Figure 6: Real-time estimates. Surprises (forecasting errors ηt|t−1) smoothed by their two
months rolling window sum (upper plot) and accumulated throughout iterations (lower plot).
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Notes: Units are basis points of an eight weeks rolling window sum throughout iterations (upper plot) and
accumulated basis points (lower plot). Belgium (BE), France (FR), Germany (GE), Greece (GR), Ireland (IR),
Italy (IT), Portugal (PT), Spain (SP), United Kingdom (UK) and United States (US).
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Figure 7: Real-time estimates. Contributions to the updating equation of f2t (Mit, that is,
Kalman gain, Kt, times the prediction errors ηt|t−1) smoothed by their two months rolling
window sum (upper plot) and accumulated throughout iterations (lower plot).
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Notes: Units are basis points of an eight weeks rolling window sum throughout iterations (upper plot) and
accumulated basis points (lower plot). Belgium (BE), France (FR), Germany (GE), Greece (GR), Ireland (IR),
Italy (IT), Portugal (PT), Spain (SP), United Kingdom (UK) and United States (US).
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Table 1: Summary statistics for the sovereign CDS spreads of ten sovereign CDS spreads.
BE FR GE GR IR IT PT SP UK US
Full sample Mean 94.8 64.3 41.0 1092.7 244.6 142.4 259.0 143.9 72.0 39.0
SD 87.8 62.3 33.5 3013.7 234.4 126.8 321.3 124.2 33.5 20.9
Max 364.6 251.0 133.0 29082.7 1083.0 538.4 1253.1 446.3 162.3 99.6
Min 3.0 1.4 1.8 11.0 2.5 11.4 7.2 5.5 6.7 1.2
Before 10/2009 Mean 36.3 23.3 20.0 84.7 84.3 63.5 48.6 50.9 56.6 27.3
SD 34.7 21.9 20.1 74.1 92.3 51.6 35.4 40.1 43.0 21.0
Max 147.4 94.5 89.2 272.8 346.0 197.5 143.4 150.5 162.3 99.6
Min 3.0 1.4 1.8 11.0 2.5 11.4 7.2 5.5 6.7 1.2
After 10/2009 Mean 161.6 111.2 65.0 2243.6 427.6 232.5 499.2 250.2 84.1 52.4
SD 82.3 60.4 29.4 4125.9 212.4 127.3 334.0 100.0 15.0 9.8
Max 364.6 251.0 133.0 29082.7 1083.0 538.4 1253.1 446.3 119.0 66.2
Min 38.6 25.2 23.1 129.7 117.0 74.4 57.5 73.8 47.9 24.0
Source: Datastream; The sample consists of weekly observations from January 1, 2007 to March 12, 2012; SD:
Standard Deviation; Min: Minimum; Max: Maximun. BE: Belgium; FR: France; GE: Germany; GR: Greece;
IR: Ireland; IT: Italy; PT: Portugal; SP: Spain; UK: United Kingdom; US: United States.
Table 2: Cointegration tests. Ten-year sovereign CDS spreads of ten OECD countries.
Complete sample (1/1/2007-12/3/2012)
H0 : r Eigenvalue Trace test Critical value p−value
At most 6∗∗ 0.11 57.31 47.86 0.005
At most 7∗ 0.07 27.73 29.80 0.084
At most 8 0.03 9.36 15.49 0.332
At most 9 0.01 1.58 3.84 0.208
First subsample (1/1/2007-12/10/2009)
H0 : r Eigenvalue Trace test Critical value p−value
At most 6∗∗ 0.21 79.90 47.86 0.000
At most 7∗∗ 0.16 47.21 29.79 0.000
At most 8∗∗ 0.15 22.56 15.49 0.003
At most 9 0.01 0.46 3.84 0.496
r denotes the number of possible cointegration relations; ∗∗ and ∗ indicate rejection of the null hypothesis at 5%
and 10%, respectively.
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Table 3: Weights of the ten sovereign CDS spreads in a principal components analysis with two
factors for the complete sample and for the first subsample.
Complete sample First subsample
PC1 PC2 PC1 PC2
BE 0.342 0.040 0.318 0.041
FR 0.342 0.114 0.320 −0.045
GE 0.343 −0.056 0.318 −0.247
GR 0.211 0.643 0.316 0.182
IR 0.325 −0.045 0.310 −0.317
IT 0.338 0.084 0.318 0.207
PT 0.325 0.251 0.314 0.502
SP 0.339 0.050 0.315 0.384
UK 0.279 −0.503 0.320 −0.142
US 0.289 −0.489 0.308 −0.580
Table 4: Correlation matrix, sample period previous to 12th October 2009. Ten OECD coun-
tries.
BE FR GE GR IR IT PT SP UK US
BE 1
FR 0.99 1
GE 0.98 0.99 1
GR 0.96 0.97 0.95 1
IR 0.94 0.94 0.96 0.95 1
IT 0.98 0.98 0.96 0.99 0.93 1
PT 0.97 0.97 0.94 0.97 0.90 0.98 1
SP 0.96 0.97 0.95 0.97 0.94 0.97 0.99 1
UK 0.97 0.98 0.98 0.97 0.97 0.97 0.93 0.94 1
US 0.95 0.96 0.96 0.93 0.92 0.94 0.90 0.90 0.97 1
BE: Belgium; FR: France; GE: Germany; GR: Greece; IR: Ireland; IT: Italy; PT: Portugal; SP: Spain; UK:
United Kingdom; US: United States.
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Table 5: Difference of correlation matrices (after minus before 12th October 2009 subsamples).
Ten OECD countries.
BE FR GE GR IR IT PT SP UK US
BE 0
FR −0.02 0
GE −0.03 −0.01 0
GR −0.45 −0.36 −0.38 0
IR −0.11 −0.20 −0.20 −0.60 0
IT −0.03 0.00 −0.01 −0.43 −0.22 0
PT −0.06 −0.03 0.00 −0.39 −0.05 −0.06 0
SP 0.00 −0.03 −0.04 −0.44 −0.07 −0.06 −0.07 0
UK −0.24 −0.20 −0.19 −0.60 −0.52 −0.16 −0.25 −0.31 0
US −0.22 −0.29 −0.26 −0.66 −0.10 −0.32 −0.18 −0.13 −0.46 0
Correlation matrix of the subsample after October 2009 minus the correlation matrix of the subsample previous
that date. BE: Belgium; FR: France; GE: Germany; GR: Greece; IR: Ireland; IT: Italy; PT: Portugal; SP: Spain;
UK: United Kingdom; US: United States.
Table 6: Loading matrices estimation of the dynamic factor model for ten OECD countries.
Matrix A SD Matrix B SD
BE 0.144 0.008 0.027 0.006
GR 0.031 0.011 0.007 0.014
IR 0.092 0.010 0.118 0.009
IT 0.143 0.009 0.048 0.007
PT 0.073 0.009 0.120 0.008
SP 0.136 0.008 0.052 0.006
FR 0.136 0.007
GE 0.126 0.007
UK 0.123 0.010
US 0.093 0.011
BE: Belgium; FR: France; GE: Germany; GR: Greece; IR: Ireland; IT: Italy; PT: Portugal; SP: Spain; UK:
United Kingdom; US: United States. SD: Standard Deviation.
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